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Abstract: There are two main opposing schools of statistical reasoning,
Frequentist and Bayesian approaches. Until recent days, the frequentist or
classical approach has dominated the scientific research, but Bayesianism has
reappeared with a strong impulse that is starting to change the situation.
Recently the controversy about the primacy of one of the two approaches
seems to be unfinished at a philosophical level, but scientific practices are
giving an increasingly important position to the Bayesian approach. This
paper eludes philosophical debate to focus on the pragmatic point of view
of scientists’ day-to-day practices, in which Bayesian methodology is very
useful. Several facts and operational values are described as the core-set for
understanding the change.
Keywords: Bayesian, frequentist, statistics, causality, uncertainty.
Introduction. From dice to propensities.
When I was developing my PhD research trying to design a comprehen-
sive model to understand scientific controversies and their closures, I was
fascinated by statistical problems present in them. The perfect realm of
numbers was not able to help to establish clearly causal relationships, nor
to agree with one unified statistical conception. Two main schools, Bayesian
and frequentist, were fighting each other to demonstrate their own superior-
ity and their own truthful approach. It is an interesting dilemma to analyze.
Although I decided then to focus on more general epistemic questions I was
1∗ This paper is the result of the communication that I presented on XIIth International
Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, held in Oviedo, 12th August
2003.
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convinced about the necessity to return to the problem in the future with a
thorough study.
Causality has been one of the main topics of the history of philosophical
and scientific thought, perhaps the main one: Where do we come from?
What is the cause of all things? What will happen? Cosmogonical answers
where the first attempt to explain in a causal way the existence of things
and beings. The Greek creation myth involved a game of dice between Zeus,
Poseidon, and Hades. Later, and beyond myths, Aristotle was the strongest
defender of the causal and empirical approach to reality (Physics, II, 4-6)
although he considered the possibility of chance, especially the problem of
the dice game (On Heavens, II, 292a30) and probabilities implied in it. But
this had nothing to do with the ideas about atomistic chance of Leucippus
and Democritus nor Lucrecius’ controversial clinamen’s theory. Hald (1988)
affirms the existence of probabilistic thought, not mathematical, in Classical
Antiquity. We can also find traces of it in medieval Talmudic and Rabbinical
texts, and we know that in 960, the bishop Wibolf of Cambrai calculated 56
diverse ways of playing with 3 dice. De Vetula, a Latin poem from XIIIth
century, tells us of 216 possibilities. The funny origins of statistical thought:
religious man reasoning about games.
In 1494 Luca Paccioli defined the basic principles of algebra and multi-
plication tables up to 60×60 in his book Summa de arithmetica, geometria,
proportioni e proportionalita. He posed the first serious statistical problem
of two men playing a game called ‘balla’, which is to end when one of them
has won six rounds. However, when they stop playing A has only won five
rounds and B three. How should they divide the wager? It would be another
200 years before this problem was solved.
In 1545 Girolamo Cardano wrote the books Ars magna (the great art) and
Liber de ludo aleae (book on games of chance). This was the first attempt
to use mathematics to describe statistics and probability, and accurately
described the probabilities of throwing various numbers with dice. Galileo
expanded on this by calculating probabilities using two dice.
Blaise Pascal (1660) refined the theories of statistics and, with Pierre de
Fermat, solved the ‘balla’ problem of Paccioli. These all paved the way for
modern statistics, which essentially began with the use of actuarial tables to
determine insurance for merchant ships. In 1662, Antoine Arnauld and Pierre
Nicole, publish the influentialLa logique ou l’art de penser, where we can find
statistical probabilities. Games and their statistical roots worried people
like Cardano, Pascal, Fermat or Huygens (Weatherdord, 1982), although
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all of them were immersed in a strict mechanistic paradigm. Huygens is
considered the first scientist interested in scientific probability, and in 1657 he
published De ratiotiniis in aleae ludo. Later, De Moivre wrote the influential
De mensura sortis (1711), and seventy eight years later, Laplace published his
Philosophical Assay About Probability. In the 1730s, Daniel Bernoulli Jacob’s
nephew) developed the idea of utility as the mathematical combination of the
quantity and perception of risk.
In 1763 an influential paper written by Reverend Thomas Bayes was pub-
lished posthumously. Richard Price, who was a friend of his, worked on the
results of his efforts to find the solution to the problem of computing a dis-
tribution for the parameter of a binomial distribution: An Essay towards
solving a Problem in the Doctrine of Chances. Proposition 9 in the essay
represented the main result of Bayes. Degrees of belief are therein consid-
ered as a basis for statistical practice. This classical version of Bayesianism
had a long history beginning with Bayes and continuing through Laplace to
Jeffreys, Keynes and Carnap in the twentieth century. Later, in the 1930’s, a
new type of Bayesianism appeared, the ‘subjective Bayesianism’ of Ramsey
and De Finetti2.
At the end of XIXth century, a lot of things were changing in the scientific
and philosophical arena. The end of the idea of ‘causality’ and the conflicts
about observation lied at the heart of the debate. Go¨del attacked Hilbert’s
axiomatic approach to mathematics and Bertrand Russell, as clever as ever,
told us: “The law of causality (...) is a relic of a bygone age, surviving, like
the monarchy, only because it is erroneously supposed to do no harm (...)
The principle ‘same cause, same effect’, which philosophers imagine to be
vital to science, is therefore utterly otiose”3.
In the 1920’s arose from the works of Fischer (1922), Neyman and Pearson
(1928) the classic statistical paradigm: frequentism. They use the relative
frequency concept, that is, you must perform one experiment lots of times
and measure the proportion where you get a positive result. This proportion,,
if you perform the experiment enough times, is the probability. If Neyman
and Pearson wrote their first joint paper and presented their approach as one
among alternatives, Fisher, with his null hypothesis testing4 gave a different
2 Ramsey (1931), de Finetti (1937) and Savage (1954).
3 In 1913. Quoted from Suppes (1970): 5.
4 Nevertheless, this is a controversial concept. See Anderson et al (2000). Note that
the authors try to find alternatives to null hypothesis testing inside frequentist approach,
considering Bayesian methods “computationally difficult and there may continue to be
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message: his statistics was the formal solution of the problem of inductive
inference (Gigerenzer, 1990: 228).
Philosophers of science like Karl R. Popper were talking about A World
of Propensities. Nancy Cartwright defends today a probabilistic theory of
causation5. We live in a world with plenty of uncertainty and risk, because
we think that this is the true nature of things. Heisenberg’s indetermination
principle and the society of risk are different ways by which we understand
reality and, at the same time, react to it. Statistics is at the root of our
thoughts. But are our thoughts by nature frequentist or Bayesian? Which
of the two schools is the better one for scientific practice? This article tries
not to address this to philosophers of science but to scientists from diverse
scientific fields, from High Energy Physics to Medicine. Beyond philosophers’
words, scientific activity makes its own rules. Normative philosophy of science
should turn into a prescriptive discipline, in addition to a clarifying and
descriptive activity.
These are some of the philosophical and historical6 aspects of causality
but, what about statistical theory and, most importantly, its practice?
What does ‘Bayesian’ or ‘Frequentist’ mean?
I have omitted in the previous chapter any reference to Bayesian or fre-
quentist approaches. General theory of causality is not necessarily proper
to statistical practice, although we must recognize the existence of theories
about statistical practice. In fact, two of them are the leading ways to un-
derstand several uses of statistics: Bayesian and frequentist approaches.
Bayesian approach. This perspective on probabilities, says that a prob-
ability is a measure of a person’s degree of belief in an event, given the in-
formation available. Thus, probabilities refer to a state of knowledge held
by an individual, rather than to the properties of a sequence of events. The
use of subjective probability in calculations of the expected value of actions
is called subjective expected utility. There has been a renewal of interest for
objections of a fundamental nature to the use of Bayesian methods in strength-of-evidence-
assessments and conclusion-oriented, empirical science”, p. 921.
5 Cartwright, N. (1979) ‘Causal Laws and Effective Strategies’, Nouˆs, 13: 419-437.
6 For a good and curious history of statistics see Stigler, Stephen M. (1999) Statistics
on the Table: The History of Statistical Concepts and Methods, USA: Harvard University
Press (and his previous works); Salsburg, David (2001) The lady Tasting Tea: How Statis-
tics Revolutionized Science in the Twentieth Century, San Francisco: W.H. Freeman and
Company; and, finally, two good histories: Hald, A. (1990). A History of Probability and
Statistics and Their Applications before 1750, NY: Wiley;Hald, A. (1998). A History of
Mathematical Statistics from 1750 to 1930, NY: Wiley.
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Bayesianism since 1954, when L.J. Savage wrote Foundationsof Statistics.
There are a large number of types of Bayesians7, depending on their attitude
towards subjectivity in postulating priors. Recent Bayesian books: Earman
(1992), Howson & Urbach (1989), Bernardo & Smith (1996).
Frequentist approach. They understand probability as a long-run fre-
quency of a ‘repeatable’ event and developed a notion of confidence inter-
vals. Probability would be a measurable frequency of events determined from
repeated experiments. Reichenbach, Giere or Mayo have defended that ap-
proach from a philosophical point of view, referred to by Mayo (1997) as the
‘error statistical view” (as opposed to the Bayesian or “evidential-relation
view”).
Scientific Activities and the Conductist Approach.
One of the recurrent arguments against/in favor of one of the two po-
sitions (frequentist or Bayesian) consists in saying that a true scientist is
always/never frequentist/Bayesian (you can choose between the two possi-
bilities)8. It seems to be an epistemological law about statistical practices:
“A true scientist never belongs to the opposite statistical school”. What I can
say is that this is a usual metatheoretical thought about frequentist/Bayesian
approaches and their ontological fitting with reality, which is not useful for
clarifying the closure of scientific controversies, because they depend on an-
other kind of values. We cannot know what happens exactly in scientists’
minds, but we can know how they act and, therefore, infer from their ac-
tions how they think. Obviously, we suppose and accept cognitive activity
for scientists. The question is: at what cost can we introduce cognitive argu-
ments inside the statistical techniques embedded in scientific practices? And
when we talk about ‘cognition’ me must include not only rational aspects of
cognition, but also irrational ones9.
As an initial and simple exercise I tried to search on the Internet for
7 Ironically, Good, I., J., (1971) told about “46656 kinds of Bayesians”, Amer. Statist.,
25: 62-63.
8 As an example, see the complete ideas of Giere, Ronald (1988) Understanding Scien-
tific Reasoning, USA: The University of Chicago, p.189 “Are Scientists Bayesian Agents?
(. . . ) The overwhelming conclusion is that humans are not bayesian agents”, and of B.
Efron (1986), “Why isn’t everyone a Bayesian?” American Statistician. 40: 1-5 or R.D.
Cousins (1995), “Why isn’t every physicist a Bayesian?” Am. J. Phys. 63: 398. The last
two do not need to be quoted.
9 Paul Thagard (1992) made special software, Explanatory Coherence By Harmony
Optimization (ECHO) to analyze scientific knowledge as a set of hypotheses and the
relationships established among them:
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quantitative information about both schools. I typed ‘Bayesian’ or ‘frequen-
tist’ on several websites’ search engines and found these results: on Google,
appeared 869.000 results for ‘Bayesian’ and 18.300 for ‘frequentist’; on Na-
ture’s journal 109 and 2 results, respectively; 82 and 6 on Science; finally,
on Medline 3877 and 124.
What does it mean? Is the Bayesian approach the best one? Is it widely
used inside hypercommunities but not in the ‘common’ world? There is a
fact: everyday, more and more researchers are using Bayesian methodologies
to do their research. Meanwhile, the dominating position of frequentism is
weaker and weaker, although still dominating.
But we must go to the core set of the question: what are the new values,
beyond scientific values from Merton10, implied in the choice between the
two schools?
3.1. Formational values: we will use the words of Bland & Altman
(1998): 1160, to illustrate these kinds of values: “Most statisticians have
become Bayesians or Frequentists as a result of their choice of university11.
They did not know that Bayesians and Frequentists existed until it was too
late and the choice had been made. There have been subsequent conversions.
Some who were taught the Bayesian way discovered that when they had huge
quantities of medical data to analyze the frequentist approach was much
‘p’ refers to weight, ‘a’ to acceptation and ‘i/j’ are the acquired values by the values of
a system. Scientists are exposed to hot cognitive variables (such as emotional or moti-
vational variables). Motivation affects the explanatory coherence of scientists. Freedman
(1992):332, admits that social processes must be included in the computational models.
There is a ‘social principle’ in the ECHO model: some evidence E, produced by a rival in
a specific theoretical field appears to have a reduced evidential value. Cognition appeals
to something more than mental representations of classic rational values, and must con-
sider the existence of an ‘emotional coherence’ (as the expanded model HOTCO, for ‘hot
coherence’, Thagard, 2000: 173). See also Thagard (1988, 1999).
10 The “values” of academic science, as Robert K. Merton wrote in 1942 are: communal-
ism, universality, disinterestedness, originality and skepticism. Merton, R. K. (1942) “The
normative structure of science”, in The Sociology of Science, N.W. Storer (ed.): 267-278.
11 The same idea is repeated in a different way by a High Energy physicist, D’Agostini
(1998:1): “The intuitive reasoning of physicists in conditions of uncertainty is closer to
the Bayesian approach than to the frequentist ideas taught at university and which are
considered the reference framework for handling statistical problems”. One thing is the
theory taught at university, and another one is the true scientific practice.
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quicker and more practical, although they remain Bayesian at heart. Some
Frequentists have had Damascus road conversions12 to the Bayesian view.
Many practicing statisticians, however, are fairly ignorant of the methods
used by the rival camp and too busy to have time to find out”. As the
epidemiologist Berger says (2003): “practicing epidemiologists are given little
guidance in choosing between these approaches apart from the ideological
adherence of mentors, colleagues and editors”. Giles (2002), talking about
members of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climatic Change (IPCC), says
that those researchers were suspicious of Bayesian statistics because “these
attitudes also stem from the authors’ backgrounds”, p. 477.
So, the arguments go beyond the ethereal philosophical arena and closer
to practical ones. Better opportunities to find a good job is an important
argument, and the value of a Bayesian academic training is now accepted:
“where once graduate students doing Bayesian dissertations were advised to
try not to look too Bayesian when they went on the job market, now great
numbers of graduate students try to include some Bayesian flavor in their
dissertations to increase their marketability”, Wilson (2003): 372.
3.2. Metaphysical values: by their writings, we can extract some
information about scientist’s thoughts. Knowledge is framed by feelings,
emotions, facts and, even, faiths. How to consider, then, classical and con-
tinuous disputes among the full range of possible positions between realists
and subjectivists?
All scientists believe for different reasons, that the constituents of the
world have certain dispositions that can be discovered under certain inves-
tigative conditions. As expressed by Hacking (1972): 133: “Euler at once
retorted that this advice is metaphysical, not mathematical. Quite so! The
choice of primitive concepts for inference is a matter of ‘metaphysics’. The
orthodox statistician has made one metaphysical choice and the Bayesian
another”.
3.3. Philosophical values (from the scientists’ point of view): to
be honest, we must accept that most scientists are not interested in the phi-
losophy of scientific results. But when it an extraordinary fact happens, like
a controversy or a paradigm change, they accept it and turn to philosophical
ideas (if they have been clearly formulated). Sternberg (2001), writing about
12 See the curious arguments from a former frequentist: Harrell, Frank E. Jr (2000)
Practical Bayesian data Analysis from a Former Frequentist, downloadable PDF document
at http://hesweb1.ed.virginia.edu/biostat/teaching/bayes.short.course.pdf.
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the controversies about how to evaluate a diagnostic test, says: “Bayesian
methods (. . . ) are all scientifically sound approaches for the evaluation of di-
agnostic tests in the absence of a perfect gold standard13, whereas any version
of discrepant analysis is not”, p. 826. Following the same way of reasoning,
the National Academy of Sciences (1993) admitted: “Full Bayesian analy-
ses are often complicated and time-consuming. Moreover, because the data
necessary to estimate the component prior probabilities and likelihood ratios
may be unavailable, quantitative expression of the assessor’s uncertainty is
often highly subjective, even if based on expert opinion (. . . ) despite the
committee’s attempts at objectivity, the interpretation of scientific evidence
always retains at least some subjective elements. Use of such ‘objective’ stan-
dards as Pvalues, confidence intervals, and relative risks may convey a false
sense that such judgments are entirely objective. However judgments about
potential sources of bias, although based on sound scientific principles, can-
not usually be quantified. This is true even for the scientific ‘gold standard’
in evaluating causal relationships: the randomized clinical trial” pp.25, 31.
In that case, in spite of all that was said, the NAS adopted the Bayesian ap-
proach for their analysis. Lilford & Braunholtz (1996:604) also argue: “when
the situation is less clear cut (. . . ) conventional statistics may drive decision
makers into a corner and produce sudden, large changes in prescribing. The
problem does not lie with any of the individual decision makers, but with the
very philosophical basis of scientific inference. We propose that conventional
statistics should not be used in such cases and that the Bayesian approach is
both epistemologically and practically superior”. And Spiegelhalter (1999):
“There are strong philosophical reasons for using a Bayesian approach”.
3.4. Simplicity14and cheapness: computerizing statistical thought.
One of the arguments against Bayesian methods says that the Bayesian ap-
proach is too complex to apply in day-to-day research. And simplicity is
one of the best values for scientific activity15. But during the past few
13 Black & Craig (2002): 2653 define ‘gold standard’ as: “a diagnostic test with 100 per
cent sensitivity and specificity”. They admit that, frequently, this occurs because of the
prohibitive cost or non-existence of a gold standard test. In this situation, rather than
using a single imperfect test, multiple imperfect tests may be used to gain an improved
prevalence estimate. In general, the results of these tests are correlated, given a subjects’
disease status. Bayesian methods are a better solution for these cases than frequentist
ones.
14 See the philosophical reflections about Bayesianism and simplicity of Escoto (2003).
15 Gigerenzer, Gerd (1989) “We Need Statistical Thinking, Not Statisti-
cal Rituals”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 21, 2 (1998): 199-200 is a
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years a large amount of Bayesian software programs have appeared which
have changed the situation: now it is easy, fast and cheap to implement the
Bayesian approach in experimental practices. Programs like BACC, [B/D],
BOA, BUGS (Bayesian inference using Gibbs sampling, and WinBUGS),
MINITAB, EPIDAT, FIRST BAYES, HYDRA, STATA, SAS, S-Plus and
others, some of them available as freeware, make possible an efficient use
of Bayesian methods in several scientific fields. Their flexibility helps to
incorporate multiple sources of data and of uncertainty within a single co-
herent composite model. Until the 1980’s, the potential for the application of
Bayesian methods was limited by the technical demands placed on the inves-
tigator. Over the past fifteen years these limitations have been substantially
reduced by innovations in scientific computing (faster computer processors)16
and drastic drops in the cost of computing (Editorial BMJ, 1996). These
changes and an increase in the number of statisticians trained in Bayesian
methodology are encouraging the new status of Bayesianism (Tan, 2001).
Medicine is, perhaps, the scientific field in which Bayesian analysis is be-
ing more intensively applied (Szolovits, 1995; Grunkemeir & Payne, 2002).
Two trends, evidence-based medicine and Bayesian statistics are changing
the practice of contemporary medicine. As Ashby & Smith (2000) tells us:
“Typically the analysis from such observational studies [those of epidemiol-
ogy] is complex, largely because of the number of covariates. Probably for
this reason, Bayesian applications in epidemiology had to wait for the recent
explosion in computer power, but are now appearing in growing numbers”,
p. 329917. We must also take into account the expert (Bayesian) systems; a
topic developed on section 4.2.
The development of Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) computation
algorithms, now permit fitting models with incredible realistic complexity18.
very critical of the complexities of frequentist methods. Downloadable at
http://www.mpib-berlin.mpg.de/dok/full/gg/ggwnsbabs/ggwnsbabs.html. A similarly
aggressive work: Rindskopf, D. (1998) “Null-hypothesis tests are not completely stupid,
but Bayesian statistics are better”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 21: 215-216.
16 See NAS (1991).
17 See also Breslow (1990) and Ahsby & Hutton (1996).
18 When we study models for multiple comparisons, we can see that frequentists adjust
Multiple Comparison Procedures (MCP) considering intersection of multiple null hypothe-
ses. They also advocate for a control of the familywise error-rate (FWE). So, “Bayesians
will come closer to a frequentist per-comparison or to a FEW approach depending on the
credibility they attach to the family of (null) hypotheses being tested (. . . ) the Bayesian
is closer to the per-comparisonist”, Berry (1999): 216.
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The Bayesian approach has received a great impulse from MCMC models
(Dunson, 2001; Carli & Louis, 2000; Gelman et al 1996). MCMC procedures
are also extremely flexible and constitute the primary factor responsible for
the increased use and visibility of Bayesian methods in recent years.
3.5. Ethical values: we can find an appeal to ethical values as parts of
arguments about both schools. Wilson (2003) affirms that Bayesian methods
are a more ethical approach to clinical trials and other problems. On the
contrary, Fisher (1996) affirms that “Ethical difficulties may arise because of
the differing types of belief”, especially during Randomized Clinical Trials
(the Phase III Trials in the FDA model).
From the history of standard literature on ethics in medical research, man
can infer the great value of prior beliefs in clinical trials. And the key concept
is ‘uncertainty’: “Subjective opinions are typically not included in the back-
ground material in a clinical trial protocol, but as they are often a driving
force behind the existence of a protocol, and as uncertainty is deemed to be
ethically important, documentation will be useful. Without documentation
it may be difficult to determine whether uncertainty exists. (. . . ) There
are compelling ethical reasons that uncertainty should be present before a
clinical trial is undertaken” (Chaloner & Rhame, 2001: 591 and 596). When
uncertainty is introduced in the reasoning procedures, the quantification of
prior beliefs and, therefore, the use of Bayesian methodologies, seems to be
an operationally and ethically better decision.
3.6. Better fitting for results: Berger (2003), proposes using both
models and studying case by case their possibilities: “based on the philo-
sophical foundations of the approaches, Bayesian models are best suited to
addressing hypotheses, conjectures, or public-policy goals, while the frequen-
tist approach is best suited to those epidemiological studies which can be
considered ‘experiments’, i.e. testing constructed sets of data”. Usually, we
find no such equitable position.
But this is not a theoretical question but a practical one: Bayesian meth-
ods work better than frequentist. Therefore, Bayesian methods are increasing
their application range, although it does not always mean that there are more
‘true Bayesians’. As Wilson (2003) explains:” their methodological successes
[from Bayesian] have indeed impressed many within the field and without,
but those who have adopted the Bayesian methods have often done so with-
10
out adopting the Bayesian philosophy”19. As Popper or Lakatos20 could say:
“Bayesian methods solve problems better than frequentist ones”. And practi-
cal success usually means the theory’s success. Look to the history of science:
Copernicus astronomical tables were better than those of Ptolomeus and if
at first, were accepted as an instrument, in a later they were considered as a
true representation of reality.
So, The Scientific Information and Computing Center at CIBA-GEIGY’s
Swiss headquarters in Basle moved towards the systematic use of Bayesian
methods not so much as a result of theoretical conviction derived from philo-
sophical debates, but rather as a pragmatic response to the often experienced
inadequacy of traditional approaches to deal with the problems with which
CIBA-GEIGY statisticians were routinely confronted (Racine et al, 1986).
An example: clinical trials made by pharmaceutical industries are usually
Bayesian (Estey & Thall, 2003) although such methods are not easily imple-
mented (Wang et al, 2002).
Bayesian methods are ideally suited to dealing with multiples sources
of uncertainty, and risk assessment must include a lot of them: one ex-
periment can be affected by several terms like sex, age, occupation, skill
of technician, number of specimens, time of sampling, genetic background,
source of intake. . . So, according to an epidemiologist, Dunson (1991): 1225:
“Bayesian approaches to the analysis of epidemiological data represent a
powerful tool for interpretation of study results21 and evaluation of hypothe-
ses about exposure-disease relations. These tools allow one to consider a
much broader class of conceptual and mathematical models than would have
19 See the Editorial from British Medical Journal (1996), “most people find Bayesian
probability much more akin to their own thought processes (...) The areas in which there
is most resistance to Bayesian methods are those were the frequentist paradigm took root
in the 1940s to 1960s, namely clinical trials and epidemiology. Resistance is less strong in
areas where formal inference is not so important, for example during phase I and II trials,
which are concerned mainly with safety and dose finding”.
20 Popper, Karl R. (1963). Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific
Knowledge. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Popper, Karl R. (1972). Objective
Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Popper, Karl
R. (1959). The Logic of Scientific Discovery. New York: Basic Books, Inc. Lakatos, I.
‘Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes’, in Lakatos, I &
Musgrove, A. (eds). Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 1970; Lakatos, I. The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, (ed. J.
Worrall & G. Currie). Cambridge University Press, 1978; Lakatos, I & Musgrove, A. (eds).
Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1970.
21 For experimental Bayesian design see Chaloner & Verdinelli (1995).
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been possible using non-Bayesian approaches”22. Grunkmeier & Payne (2002:
1901), talking about surgery enumerate several advantages of Bayesian statis-
tics applied to it: “(1) providing direct probability statements – which are
what most people wrongly assume they are getting from conventional statis-
tics; (2) formally incorporating previous information in statistical inference
of a data set, a natural approach which follows everyday reasoning; and (3)
flexible, adaptive research designs allowing multiple examination of accumu-
lating study data”. The Bayesian approach is more efficient at unifying and
calculating multilevel causal relationships23.
3.7. Diffusion of science: guidelines. At the core of science remains
information communication. By the process of writing and communicating
his/her results, a scientist is at the same time evaluated (through peer review)
and judged (by his/her colleagues). All the norms implied in the guidelines,
define a trend in ‘good’ scientific practices24. And those groups who control
the communication channels can make sure that special kinds of ideas are
never allowed. Therefore, design and control of communication channels is
something crucial for the interest of a community.
The frequentist approach has dominated statistics journals all through
XXth Century but, recently, Bayesians are gaining more and more power.
As Wilson (2003): 372, says: “Bayesians have successfully and extensively
published in JASA and other prominent journals, bringing their methods
into the spotlight where they cannot be ignored”. It is not only a question of
general perception but also of radical changes in the bases of the epistemic
frame. The International Committee of Medical Journal Editors, wrote the
Uniform Requirements for Manuscripts Submitted to Biomedical Journals,
which you can consult at http://www.icmje.org, where they specified for sta-
22 Freedman (1996) remarks that epidemiological studies cannot be usually made with-
out external information. He also affirms that the choice of a p−value, like P¡0.05, implies
the inclusion of a subjective factor in the evaluation of the experimental results.
23 Thagard (1999) has offered a very powerful conceptual framework to understand
scientific explanations of diseases with his idea of “causal network instantiation” (p. 114).
According to him: “causal networks are not simple schemas that are used to provide single
causes for effects, but they instead describe complex mechanisms of multiple interacting
factors”, p. 115-116. But Thagard is no Bayesian: he pursues another line of explanation
which he considers better suited to psychological reasoning: explanatory coherence. (Ibid.
p. 65-66).
24 We must also include publication bias such as the quicker publishing of papers of
studies with positive results than those with null or negative findings, (Dickersin et al,
2002).
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tistical norms: “Avoid relying solely on statistical hypothesis testing, such
as the use of P values, which fail to convey important quantitative informa-
tion”25.
Spiegelhalter (1999) reflects that: “Current international guidelines for
statistical submissions to drug regulatory authorities state that ‘the use of
Bayesian and other approaches may be considered when the reasons for their
use are clear and when the resulting conclusions are sufficiently robust”’26.
So, these new trends ‘accepted’ as the new axiological frame for statistical
research have changed the weight of both schools: while frequentist models
are decreasing their expansion, Bayesian ones are being employed in an in-
creasing number of situations. Basan˜ez (2004) has explained the reasons for
this gradual shift: practical, theoretical and philosophical.
Cognition and statistics:
Looking into the scientist’s (human) mind. If we have looked to
external activity in the previous chapter, now we must analyze the inter-
nal or cognitive activity of human beings. The first and more important
sense for humans is the visual capacity. The latest studies about human vi-
sual processes (Geisler & Kersten, 2002) show that Bayesian explanations fit
better than frequentist when we must explain how we process visual infor-
mation and react properly to it. The Bayesian approach seems to be optimal
to explain in the broader biological context, plasticity, learning and natural
selection27. Perception and inference work in a Bayesian way (Knill et al,
1996). If we consider the statistical properties of natural environments and
how these interact in the process of natural selection to determine the de-
sign of perceptual and cognitive systems, we must accept that the Bayesian
framework captures and generalizes, in a formal way, many of the impor-
tant ideas of other approaches to perception and cognition (Geisler & Diehl,
2003). Computational (Marr, 1982) and evolutionary (Pinker, 1997) studies
are well explained and unified by the Bayesian framework (Liu & Kersten,
1998; Shiffrin & Steyvers, 1997; Legge, Klitz & Tjan, 1997; Dosher & Lu,
2000; Stankiewicz, Legge & Mansfield, 2000). But human evolution can be
25 We must also recognize that the use of statistical methodologies in medical research
is highly controversial, beyond the Bayesian-frequentist dilemma (Altman et al, 2002).
26 See http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi m0999/is 7208 319/ai 55721117
[electronic resource], accessed August, 1st 2004.
27 Nevertheless, we can find completely opposite opinions. As an example, Fisher (1996)
says: “Humans do not and cannot behave in a Bayesian manner”, p. 424. And he also
justifies his ideas appealing to human evolution!
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employed to demonstrate the opposite arguments: “in his evaluation of evi-
dence, man is apparently not a conservative Bayesian: he is not a Bayesian
at all” (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982).
Neural networks28 are difficult to study because of their complexity and in
the Bayesian approach these issues can be handled in a natural and consistent
way. Several problems which appeared in the standard neural network meth-
ods can be solved by the Bayesian approach. For example, “the unknown
degree of complexity and the resulting model is handled by defining vague
(non-informative) priors for the hyper-parameters that determine the model
complexity, and the resulting model is averaged over all model complexities
weighted by their posterior probability giving the data sample. (. . . ) The
Bayesian analysis yields posterior predictive distributions for any variables of
interest, making the computation of confidence intervals possible”, Lampinen
& Vehtari (2001):7.
An important moment in the controversies about both schools was the
book written by Howson and Urbach in 1989 (see also the paper of 1991)
about hypothesis evaluation and inferences using the Bayesian approach.
They affirm that the Bayesian view starts off acknowledging that subjec-
tive assessment of likelihood is an important part of theory selection and
construction, and makes it part of the philosophy of science. The power
of scientific reasoning then, results not from some elusive objective logic of
discovery, but because our innate inference abilities lead from observation of
evidence to beliefs that follow probability calculus, and hence our sense of
increasing credibility tends to reflect greater likelihood of a theory making
accurate predictions. It follows that, our beliefs can be measured as proba-
bilities, and probabilities can be used to confirm theories. In that case, novel
observations should have and do have special importance in theory construc-
tion. The authors introduce probability calculus in simple algebraic terms
and discuss its application to the philosophy of science.
Robot Minds: Expert Systems and the AI. One of the Artificial
Intelligence trends is the design of expert systems. These are intended to
replicate the decision making of a human expert within narrowly defined do-
mains29. Such domains are highly specialized: Logic Theorist was the first
28 And the “Bayesian Networks”, introduced in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s, repre-
senting an important advance in probabilistic reasoning for artificial intelligence, as you
have seen, and expert systems. See Glymour (2003).
29 And such systems have three primary components: a knowledge base, decision rules,
and an inference engine (Kurzweil, 1990: 292).
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expert system and was made in 1955 by Herbert Simon and Allan Newell as
a logic theorist. This expert system discovered most of the principles written
by Russell & Whitehead in Principia Mathematica. We also have Heuristic
Dendral (mass spectrography, 1967), Macsyma (indefinite integrals solver,
1967), Macsyma (mathematics teacher, 1967), Internist (internal medicine,
1970), Mycin (blood infections specialist, 1974), Prospector (geology, 1978),
and so on until the present day30. The engineering AI approach to compu-
tational philosophy of science is allied with “¡¡android epistemology¿¿, the
epistemology of machines that may or may not be built like humans” (Tha-
gard, in Bynum 1998: 52). Most current expert systems apply Bayesian
probability to their studies. One of them has discovered previously unsus-
pected fine structure in the infrared spectra of stars (Cheeseman, 1990)
But what is the connection between AI’s expert systems and statistics
and why is it mostly developed in a Bayesian way? The keystone of all
this is the idea of uncertainty31. We humans, must decide a lot of actions
without complete data about facts we are analyzing, that is, we must take
decisions in the light of uncertain knowledge about a situation. In 1947, von
Neumann and Morgenstern developed an axiomatic framework called utility
theory, founded on the pre-existing axioms of probability theory (Horvitz,
1993). Utility theory provides a formal definition of preference and of rational
decisions under uncertainty, and its axioms define a measure of preference
called utility. Then, utility theory affirms that people should make decisions
that have optimal average, or expected, utility. Those expected values fit
with the idea of personal or subjective probability. The use of subjective
probability in calculations of the expected value of actions is called subjective
expected utility (SEU).
In the mid-1940s, ‘operation analysis’ was developed, matured into the
modern discipline of operations research (OR), and used after World War II
to analyze a broad spectrum of civilian problems.
SEU and OR were developed closely and led to the emergence, in the
early 1950s, of management science and decisions analysis. The 1960s rep-
resented the creation of the first expert systems, the 1970s were the realm
of vision research and, finally, the 1980s represented the maturation of rules-
based expert systems. Today, we must realize that: “subjective probability
30 In 1975 Dendral discovered a new rule to identify organic molecules, which no human
mind had ever thought. Prospector discovered in 1982 a big molybdenum deposit.
31 Understood, basically, as a situation with a lack of information. For more accurate
definitions of ‘uncertainty’ see Zimmermann (2000).
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methodology has proved extremely successful for gathering the probabilities
needed by an expert system” (Horvitz, 1993:31).
Machines are certainly not humans, but they work better and in a more
similar way to humans when they use Bayesian principles (Horvitz et al,
1988). Good results with these expert systems (such as AI learning to recog-
nize objects, Viola, 1996) are giving powerful reasons in favor of Bayesianism.
As an example, the Stanford researcher Pate´-Cornell, wrote a paper (2002) on
fusion intelligence and the Bayesian approach, trying to apply that method
to the USA Intelligence Services, and avoid another attack after the attack
suffered on September 11th, 2001. Bayesianism has reached new and more
influential levels of application and is gaining ground.
Framing values: conclusions about theories and uses.
My old Webster’s Dictionary has its own definition of “dilemma”: “1. a
situation requiring a choice between equally undesirable alternatives. 2. any
difficult or perplexing situation or problem. 3. Logic. a form of syllogism in
which the major premise is formed of two or more hypothetical propositions
and the minor premise is an exhaustive disjunctive proposition, as ¡¡If A,
then B; if C then D. Either A or C. Therefore, either B or D¿¿”.
It seems clear that we have not been talking about logic relationships in-
side statistical controversies. Therefore, the third definition is not of interest.
The second one seems to be closer to the aims of this paper: the analysis of
a complex problem for which there is no obvious solution. Finally, the last
shall be first, the first definition is the core of this paper: Does the Bayesian
vs. frequentist dilemma constitute a difficult choice ‘between equally un-
desirable alternatives’? Are we forced to die for our rational criteria like
Buridan’s donkey?
At a metatheoretical level, that is philosophy, the debate is still open
and more and more complex. But that is not the level of analysis we have
considered as crucial for the solution of the debate. We talk about scien-
tific practices in which are involved both statistical approaches. And when
scientists work, they take decisions continuously.
We have shown a new range of values that constitute part of the sta-
tistical axiology. These are non-epistemic values, but shape the underlying
framework of research epistemology. Academic training, ease of use, power-
ful infrastructures, cognitive fitting, ethics, metaphysical options, cheapness,
and better results, are the arguments to decide in favor of either one of the
two approaches. Perhaps these are not the values which theoreticians would
have chosen, but are the real values which appear when we look at scientists’
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practices and reflections.
We don’t know if the prediction made by Bruno de Finetti, that it would
take until the year 2020 for the Bayesian view of statistics to completely
prevail will be accurate. This is another question, far from our interests and
methodology. I have indicated several values that makes it possible to choose
between both approaches.
A clear fact is that Bayesian analysis is widely used in a variety of fields,
from the pioneering field of medicine to engineering, image processing, expert
systems, decision analysis, psychological diagnoses (Meehl & Rosen, 1955),
criminal investigations (Sullivan & Delaney, 1982), for presenting evidence
in court (Feinberg & Schervish, 1986; Matthew, 1994; Mossman, 2000), gene
sequencing, financial predictions, neural networks or epidemiological studies.
If we return to the classic paper of Winkler (1974) “Why are experimental
psychologists (and others) reluctant to use Bayesian inferential procedures
in practice?”32, we will read: “this state of affairs appears to be due to
a combination of factors including philosophical conviction, tradition, sta-
tistical training, lack of ‘availability’, computational difficulties, reporting
difficulties, and perceived resistance by journal editors”. Well, all these fac-
tors (non-epistemic values) are now not against but in favor of the Bayesian
approach.
Is the solution to unify as a synthesis both approaches (Berger et al, 1997),
like a synthesis solution to a dualistic problem? Could a hybrid method of
inference satisfy both camps? Is the Likelihood approach a third alternative?
(Senn, 2003). But this is, once more, a philosophical question.
Finally, we must consider the existence of a really fundamental question:
how to make decisions based on evidence. And we find a basic problem: there
are several decision levels with their own individual exigencies regarding what
is considered as evidence. If we talk about decision making in health contro-
versies, we should consider several levels like: decision making for patients
(diagnosis), decision making for individual patients (interventions), decision
making about studies (start from prior beliefs and data monitoring), deci-
sion making for pharmaceutical companies and public policy decision making
(Ashby & Smith, 2000). But these multi-criteria analyses can be found in
other scientific fields, such as forestry (Kangas & Kangas, 2004). And we find
another set of problems present in both approaches when they are applied to
32 Quoted by Lecoutre, Bruno at http://www.stat.auckland.ac.nz/∼iase/publications/5/leco0735.pdf
[electronic document]. Accessed in July 30th, 2004.
17
controversial scientific practices, such as those of risk assessment: difficulties
in establishing clear relationships, the significant sample, data interpreta-
tion, cognitive paradoxes (Simpson, Ellsberg, St. Petersbourg, Base-Rate
Fallacy,. . . ), the idea of evidence at multiple levels33, use of both models,. . .
Considering the previous arguments, we must admit that the dilemma,
understood as a choice between equally undesirable alternatives, is a false
dilemma. We have enough judgment elements to decide rationally34 between
one of two approaches, and so do scientists from diverse fields, whose words
we have reproduced here. To understand these decisions better we have
enumerated a new set of values that needs to be included in a richer and
sounder scientific axiology.
33 In the herbicide 2,4,5-T controversy we found: ”Petitioners demand sole reliance on
scientific facts, on evidence that reputable scientific techniques certify as certain. Typi-
cally, a scientist will not so certify evidence, unless the probability of error, by standard
statistical measurement, is less than 5%. That is, scientific fact is at least 95% certain.
(...) Agencies are not limited to scientific fact, to 95% certainties. Rather, they have at
least the same fact-finding powers as a jury, particularly when, as here, they are engaged
in rule-making” (Jasanoff, 1994: 51). But, at the same time: “Typically a scientist will
not...certify evidence unless the probability of error, by standard statistical measurement,
is less than 5%. That is, scientific fact is at least 95% certain. Such certainty has never
characterized the judicial or the administrative process. . . the standard of ordinary civil
litigation, a preponderance of evidence, demands only 51% certainty. A jury may weigh
conflicting evidence and certify as adjudicative (although not scientific) fact that which
it believes is more likely than not. . . Inherently, such a standard is flexible; inherently, it
allows the fact-finder to assess risks, to measure probabilities, to make subjective judg-
ments. Nonetheless, the ultimate finding will be treated, at low as fact. . . The standard
before administrative agencies is no less flexible. Agencies are not limited to scientific
fact, to 95% certainties...we must deal with the terminology of law, not science”, Miller
(1980): 75-76 (Miller made extracts from trial “Ethyl Corp. V. EPA, 541F .2d 1 (1976),
p.28,.58”).
34 Rationality must be understood as a complex activity well modeled by researchers like
Kuhn. See the interesting work of Salmon, Wesley C. (1990) Rationalityand Objectivity
in Science or Tom Kuhn Meets Tom Bayes, in Savage, C. (ed.) Minnesota Studies in the
Philosophy of Science, Vol. XIV, USA: University of Minnesota Press 175-204.
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